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the e ect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-
sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication;
on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We
document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan
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1. Introduction
Despite the growing importance of credit derivatives in recent years, the impacts of
this financial innovation on the nature and operation of credit markets are not yet fully
understood. The enhanced risk-sharing via credit default swaps (CDS) can alleviate
credit supply frictions (Saretto and Tookes (2013); Shan et al. (2014)). However, a
necessary condition for any positive e ect of CDS trading is that creditors actively use
CDS to manage credit risk. Empirical research on how and to what extent banks use
CDS is scarce.
One important determinant of the e ects of CDS on credit markets is the interplay
with banks’ existing risk management tools, such as loan syndication. A bank can limit
the exposure to a borrower in order to comply with regulatory capital requirements
and diversify the loan portfolio by syndicating, i.e., partially selling, loans (Dennis
and Mullineaux (2000)). While both CDS and partial loan sales can be used to lay
o  credit risk, tailor-made CDS are more flexible than loan sales (Du ee and Zhou
(2001)). Hence, banks may rely less on loan syndication once CDS become available.
However, there is a potential cost to the availability of CDS. Loan sales and CDS
di er in one key aspect: loan sales transfer both credit risk and control rights to the
counterparty, while CDS only transfer the credit risk. Hence, CDS trading could have
a detrimental e ect on bank monitoring incentives because although the credit risk
is transferred to the counterparty, the control rights remain with the bank (Parlour
and Winton (2013)). If the lead arranger in a syndicated loan can lay o  credit risk
anonymously via CDS, potential participants may be less willing to invest, as they
might fear that the lead bank will no longer monitor the borrower. Hence, syndication
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may become more di cult/costly and originating banks would be forced to retain
larger shares in their loans. Overall, while the theoretical e ect of CDS trading on
syndication is unambiguous — banks rely less on syndication once credit protection
via CDS is available — di erent economic mechanisms can lead to this conjecture.
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of CDS trading on loan
syndication. Further, we explicitly di erentiate risk management from moral hazard
e ects. We document that banks are 3% less likely to syndicate a loan once credit
protection via CDS is available. This is economically relevant given that only about
10% of the loans in our sample are single lender loans. On average, lead banks also
retain 5.5% more of a loan after CDS introduction. These e ects are particularly strong
if the loan is large and if the bank is more likely to use CDS for hedging purposes.
These results document a significant impact of CDS trading on primary loan markets.
Next, we di erentiate the risk management from the moral hazard e ect. Parlour
and Winton (2013) show theoretically that moral hazard problems arising from CDS
trading are less severe if the lender’s reputation is high. Our results, however, indicate
that the e ect of CDS trading on the decision to syndicate a loan is increasing in lead
arranger reputation. This means that especially large reputable banks are less likely
to sell a loan after hedging via CDS is possible. This is inconsistent with moral hazard
concerns but consistent with the notion that larger, more reputable banks are more
likely to be active in the CDS market and also use CDS for hedging purposes (Hirtle
(2009)). We then analyze loan outcomes that likely are correlated with the monitoring
service provided by banks. In particular, we test whether firms are more likely to
violate covenants after CDS are traded on the firms’ debt. Our results indicate that
this is not the case. If anything, firms are less likely to violate covenants after CDS
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inception. Finally, we analyze whether e ect of CDS trading on syndication propensity
is stronger for borrowers who require intensive monitoring, e.g., riskier, more opaque
firms. We document that the e ect is similar across borrowers.
Overall, our results indicate that an increase in moral hazard caused by CDS intro-
duction is not a major concern in the syndicated loan market. We find that the e ect
of CDS trading on syndication propensity is stronger for (i) larger, more reputable
banks, (ii) banks that are more likely to use CDS for hedging purposes, and (iii) larger
loans. These findings suggest that banks actively use CDS to manage credit risk and
substitute partial loan sales with CDS once they become available.
CDS trading and the timing of CDS inception are clearly endogenous, hence this
problem needs to be addressed in order to make causal inferences about the e ect
of CDS trading on syndication. We address these concerns by constructing a model
to predict CDS trading and further use this model to run an instrumental variable
estimation. We follow Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014)
and use banks’ foreign exchange derivative holdings as an instrument for CDS trading.1
Our results are robust to potential endogeneity concerns.
We contribute to the literature by providing novel evidence that banks actively
use CDS as a risk management tool, relying less on other risk sharing mechanisms.
Understanding the trade-o  between di erent risk management tools is important to
better comprehend the conditions under which CDS trading reduces credit supply
1 Minton et al. (2008) show that banks, which use foreign exchange derivatives are more likely to be
net buyers of CDS, i.e., are more prone to use derivatives in general. Therefore, foreign exchange
derivatives holdings are likely to be correlated with investor demand for credit protection via CDS.
As foreign exchange hedges are macro hedges, it is unlikely that this variable is directly related to
the decision to syndicate a loan.
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frictions. If CDS trading replaces existing risk management tools, it is unlikely to
have a strong impact on credit supply by banks and on loan contract terms. This
is consistent with existing studies, which find mixed e ects of CDS trading on credit
markets (Hirtle (2009); Ashcraft and Santos (2009); Saretto and Tookes (2013); Shan
et al. (2014)).2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
background and derives empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample selection
process. The main empirical analysis, demonstrating a link between CDS trading and
bank syndication activity, is presented in Section 4. Section 5 di erentiates the moral
hazard from the risk management channel. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
In a Modigliani-Miller world, bank risk management does not increase firm value as
shareholders can manage risks more e ciently by holding a well-diversified portfolio.
However, market frictions such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems lead
banks to acquire borrower specific private information that can make bank loans illiquid
and loan sales di cult. Further, if loans incorporate private information, bank failures
are costly as loans cannot be liquidated without deadweight loss (Goderis et al. (2007);
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004)). Finally, banks are required by regulation to imple-
ment risk management tools and hold equity capital to back-up risky assets. Overall,
2 Several studies analyze the e ect of CDS trading on the bond market. For example, Das et al.
(2014) find no evidence for an increase in bond market liquidity or a reduction in pricing errors.
Chava et al. (2012) show that credit ratings become less important when a market price for the risk
of a company can be observed.
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banks have strong incentives to actively manage the risk of their loan portfolio.3
Banks can manage credit risk through syndication. In a syndicated loan, the lead
bank negotiates the deal with the borrower and then decides upon which fraction of
the loan to sell to other participating lenders. Thereby, the bank can limit the size of
any single loan to comply with regulatory capital requirements and diversify their loan
portfolio by taking smaller shares in multiple syndicated loans (Dennis and Mullineaux
(2000)).4
Recently more and more firms that borrow from banks have actively traded CDS
on their debt. The CDS market is an over-the-counter derivative market where default
protection for corporate bonds and loans can be bought. Banks that have access to
credit derivatives therefore have an alternative tool to manage the risk associated with
a loan. The question that arises is whether and how a market in which loan syndication,
i.e., partial loan sales, exist is a ected by the availability of CDS?
Du ee and Zhou (2001) show theoretically that CDS can be a more flexible tool to
manage credit risk compared to loan sales if the banks informational advantage is non-
constant over the life of the loan. The lead bank is considered an ”informed lender”
who knows more about the true credit quality of the borrower than the potential
participants (Diamond (1984)). The arising adverse selection problems make loan
sales costly. Gorton and Pennachi (1995) show that banks will only sell loans if the
banks’ internal funding costs are su ciently high and/or the cost of funding loans via
loan sales is su ciently small. If the banks informational advantage varies over the life
of a loan as in Du ee and Zhou (2001), it is therefore optimal for the bank to lay o  a
3 See also Froot and Stein (1998) and Froot et al. (1993).
4 Consistent with the risk sharing motive for loan syndication, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find
that banks are more likely to syndicate larger loans and loans with longer maturities.
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larger (smaller) part of the credit risk when the information asymmetry is low (high).
Thereby, the bank can minimize the costs of adverse selection. Du ee and Zhou (2001)
show that tailor-made CDS are a flexible tool to temporarily lay o  credit risk. Loan
sales, on the other hand, are less flexible as the loan is no longer on the bank’s balance
sheet.
Hypothesis 1: Risk management via CDS is more flexible than risk management via
syndication. Therefore, banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain larger loan
shares once credit derivatives are actively traded on a borrower’s debt.
Sufi (2007) argues, building on the models of Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997), and Gorton and Pennachi (1995), that moral hazard problems exist in
syndicated loans. The ”informed” lead arranger is able to monitor and learn about the
borrower through unobservable and costly e ort. Participants, on the other hand, are
”uninformed lenders” who rely on the monitoring e ort by the lead arranger. The lower
the share of a loan that is retained by the lead arranger, the lower are the incentives
to actively monitor the borrower. As potential participants are aware of this problem,
they are only willing to invest if the lead arranger retains a large enough fraction of the
loan to credibly commit to monitor the borrower. As shown by Parlour and Winton
(2013), retaining a larger share of the loan is no longer a credible signal by the bank
if CDS are available. The lead arranger can lay o  credit risk anonymously via CDS,
which e ectively reduces the incentive to monitor. Without a credible signal by the
lead arranger, potential investors are less willing to participate in a syndicated loan.
Hence, syndication becomes less likely and the lead arranger has to retain a larger
share of the loan.
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Hypothesis 2: A commitment to monitor the borrower is less credible if laying o 
credit risk via CDS is possible, hence investors are less willing to participate in a
syndicated loan. Therefore, banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain larger
loan shares once credit derivatives are actively traded on a borrower’s debt.
Note that both Hypothesis 1 and 2 predict that the lead lender will retain a larger
fraction in syndicated loans. However, the reasons di er: Hypothesis 1 predicts that
the lender will (partially) substitute syndication via the purchase of CDS. Hypothesis
2 predicts that syndication becomes more di cult because the lender can no longer
credibly commit to monitor the borrower if CDS are available. Which e ect prevails
is an empirical question that will be addressed in the following analysis.
3. Data
3.1 Sample Selection and Main Variables
We use all USD denominated CDS spreads for all maturities obtained from Bloomberg
and the CMA database to identify firms that have actively traded CDS on their debt.
We manually match all reference entity names with the borrower names in the LPC
Dealscan database, which contains detailed information on corporate loan contracts.
We discard financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and restrict the sample to the period
from 2000 to 2010.5 We further exclude all loans by firms that have actively traded
CDS on their debt at any time during the sample period but only issue loans before
5 Loans issued prior to 2000 are excluded as the vast majority of CDS introduction dates are after
2000. However, not imposing this restriction and using all loans originated between 1990 and 2010
yields qualitatively similar results.
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or after the CDS introduction. Following Sufi (2007), we classify a lender as a lead
arranger if the variable called "Lead Arranger Credit" (provided by Dealscan) takes on
the value "Yes" or if the lender is the only lender specified in the loan contract. The final
sample is unique at the facility-lead arrangers level, i.e., there are multiple observations
per loan facility in case of multiple lead arrangers. This sample structure allows us to
control for borrower x lead arranger interaction fixed e ects throughout the empirical
analyses, i.e., we control for any unobservable borrower and bank characteristics that
are time-invariant. Finally, we merge the loan data to Compustat to obtain financial
information on the borrowers.6
We use Lead Share (%) and Sole Lender (0/1) as our main dependent variables.
Lead Share (%) is the percent of the total loan held by the lead bank. Sole Lender (0/1)
is a dummy variable, which equals one for single lender loans and zero for syndicated
loans. These variables are a direct outcome of the decision to partially sell a loan on
the primary market. The primary independent variable of interest is CDS Trading
(0/1), a dummy, which equals one if a firm has actively traded CDS on its debt at
the time of loan origination, and zero otherwise. This variable captures the marginal
impact of CDS introduction on primary loan market allocation.
3.2 Descriptives
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the final panel, distinguishing between firms
that have actively traded CDS on their debt at any point in time during the sample
period and firms that never have actively traded CDS during the sample period. The
6 We use Michael Robert’s Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database to merge Dealscan with Compustat
(see Chava and Roberts (2008) for details).
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sample comprises 21,122 facility-lead arranger combinations, 14,379 facilities, and 3,202
distinct borrowers. Thereof, 327 companies have actively traded CDS at some point
in time during the sample period.
[Table 1 here]
Panel A reports descriptives for the CDS trading indicator. 51% of the loans
by CDS firms are issued after CDS inception. Panel B reports descriptives for loan
characteristics. The mean share of the loan retained by the lead arranger is 62% for
non-CDS firms and 33% for CDS firms.7 The loan is not syndicated in 16%/2% of cases
for non-CDS/CDS firms. Unconditionally, di erences in the lead share and the fraction
of syndicated loans between CDS and non-CDS firms are unsurprising. Loans to CDS
firms are significantly larger than loans to non-CDS firms: the mean/median loan
amount is $240/$125 million for non-CDS firms and $1,140/$700 million for CDS firms.
Further, CDS firms are significantly larger than non-CDS firms: the mean/median
book value of assets is $17,700/$10,241 million for CDS firms and $2,070/$779 million
for non-CDS firms (Panel C). In general, banks are more likely to syndicate larger loans
and loans by larger borrowers (Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)), i.e., size di erences
likely explain the di erence in the average lead share between CDS and non-CDS
firms. We explicitly control for any di erences between CDS and non-CDS firm in the
multivariate analyses.
7 Note that, the number of observations is lower for the variable Lead Share (%), as the individual
shares retained by the lenders are not reported for all loans included in the Dealscan database.
However, there does not seem to be any systematic bias, i.e., loans with non-missing lead share are
similar to other loans in terms of observable characteristics (see also Ivashina (2009)). Further, the
fraction of loans with information on the lead share is similar for CDS and non-CDS firms, and for
CDS firms similar before versus after CDS are traded on the borrowers’ debt.
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4. CDS Trading, Syndication Propensity, and Lead Share
4.1 Baseline Specification
We start by establishing a general link between CDS trading and loan syndication.
Figure 1 shows the average (median) loan share retained by the lead bank before and
after CDS are actively traded on the borrowers’ debt. Further reported is a control
group. We build loan pairs via propensity score matching, i.e., for each loan by a
borrower who has actively traded CDS on the debt at some point during the sample
period we include a similar loan by a similar borrower who never has CDS traded
on the debt. We match based on the observable loan and borrower characteristics
reported in Table 1.8
[Figure 1 here]
The share retained by the lead arranger strongly increases from 24% to 28% after
CDS are actively traded on a borrower’s debt, indicating that there is indeed a struc-
tural break. The average lead share does not change significantly around the CDS
introduction date for the control group. Figure 1 further reports medians. The figure
suggests that the median share already increases before the CDS introduction. How-
ever, the proxy for the CDS introduction date is noisy and the univariate comparison
can of course only serve as a first indication that CDS trading a ects loan syndication.
Other firm characteristics may have changed at the CDS introduction date and firms
with actively traded CDS may di er from firms, which never have actively traded CDS
during our sample period.
8 See Appendix B for matched sample summary statistics.
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We follow Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and address
these issues by comparing firms before and after CDS are actively traded on the firms’
debt with firms that never have actively traded CDS at any point in time during the
sample period, using the following regression framework:
Syndicationijt = –ij + –t + — ú CDS Trading (0/1)it + “ úXit≠1 + ” ú Yijt + ‘ijt. (1)
Syndication indicates whether (or what fraction of) a loan i is sold on the primary
loan market by bank j at time t. As discussed earlier, we construct two di erent
specifications for this variable: (i) Sole Lender (0/1) indicates whether the loan is
syndicated, i.e., partially sold on the primary market. (ii) Lead Share (%) indicates
the fraction of a loan retained by the lead arranger. CDS Trading (0/1) is a dummy
variable, which equals one if a firm has active CDS trading at the time of the loan
origination date, and zero otherwise. X is a set of borrower characteristics and Y
a set of loan characteristics.9 We use firm size, measured by the log of total assets,
the market-to-book ratio of assets, leverage, tangibility, profitability, the current ratio,
the interest coverage ratio, the log of the facility amount, the deal maturity, the log
of the number of financial covenants, and indicator variables for secured facilities and
loans that include performance-pricing provisions as control variables. All variables are
defined in more detail in the Appendix. We further include borrower x lead arranger
interaction fixed e ects (–ij), i.e., we compare loans that the same borrower obtains
from the same bank before versus after CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s
debt. We thereby control for any unobservable borrower and bank characteristics that
9 As common in the literature, we obtain borrower information from the last available fiscal year
before the loan issue, i.e., at time t≠ 1.
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are time-invariant. Further included are loan purpose and loan type indicators, time
fixed e ects, and dummy variables for each rating notch.
[Table 2 here]
The results reported in Table 2 provide evidence that banks are about 3% less
likely to syndicate a loan once credit protection via CDS is available. This e ect is
economically relevant given that about 11% of the loans in the sample are single lender
loans. Further, the share retained by the lead arranger increases by 5.5%. Again, this
e ect is economically important as compared to the median value of 55%, this change
implies an increase in magnitude of about 10%.10
Turning to the control variables, we find similar e ects as Sufi (2007). The lead
arranger retains a lower share of the loan if the borrower is larger, if the loan is larger,
and if the maturity is longer. This evidence is consistent with the notion that larger
firms are less opaque, therefore moral hazard and adverse selection problems are lower.
Hence, the lead arranger can sell a larger fraction of the loan.
10 One potential concern is that an increasing number of loans are traded in the secondary market. It
could be that the availability of credit protection via CDS also increases the likelihood of secondary
market trading. The lead arranger may initially agree to retain a larger fraction of the loan but im-
mediately sell the loan after the origination. Unfortunately, Dealscan only provides loan information
as of origination so one cannot track the syndicate composition over time. However, Ivashina and
Sun (2011) show (using a hand collected sample of loan amendments) that lead arrangers almost
never sell their stakes in the loan. We additionally address this issue by excluding all companies from
the sample that issue loans, which are traded on the secondary market. We classify traded loans as
loans that have a Loan Identification Number (LIN). The LIN is the main identifier in secondary
loan market databases. For example, Drucker and Puri (2009) use the LIN to merge Dealscan with
the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) Mark-to-Market Pricing database. Our
results remain una ected.
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4.2 Endogeneity
One potential concern is that the selection of firms for CDS trading and the timing of
CDS inception may be endogenous. Unobserved di erences between CDS firms and
non-CDS firms could influence both CDS inception and the decision to syndicate a
loan. We follow Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), and Saretto
and Tookes (2013) in that we address this issue by constructing a model to predict
CDS trading for individual firms. As in Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and Saretto and
Tookes (2013), we use Lender FX Usage as an instrument for CDS Trading (0/1).
Lender FX Usage is constructed at the firm-level for each year and is defined as the
average amount of foreign exchange derivatives held by all the lead arrangers that
lent money to the company in the previous five years as a fraction of the total assets
of the lead arrangers.11 Minton et al. (2008) show that banks, which use foreign
exchange derivatives are more likely to be net buyers of CDS, hence Lender FX Usage
is correlated with investors’ demand for CDS. As foreign exchange hedges are macro
hedges, it is unlikely that this variable is directly related to the loan (and borrower)
specific syndicate structure.
The economic intuition for using Lender FX Usage as an instrument for CDS
Trading is that market participants who are overall more ”derivative-a ne” also have
a higher demand for credit protection via CDS. Ideally one would like to use both
bond and loan market information to determine investors’ demand for CDS. However,
as argued by Saretto and Tookes (2013) the hedging activity of firms’ lead banks is
expected to impact both the loan and bond components of firm’s debt. Lead lenders
11 As in Saretto and Tookes (2013) we use the foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging (not
trading) purposes.
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are also likely to underwrite and hold firms’ bonds. Yasuda (2005) shows that lead
arrangers of a firm are also likely to be chosen as the bond underwriters. Goldstein
and Hotchkiss (2007) find that lead underwriters also tend to hold significant fractions
of the bonds.
[Table 3 here]
We use this model to predict CDS trading for each company in each year to em-
ploy an instrumental variable estimation. Thereby, the probability of CDS trading as
predicted in the first stage is used as an instrument for CDS trading in the second
stage. Table 3 reports the results of the instrumental variable estimation. Column
1 reports the model that is used to predict CDS trading. These results are similar
to Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and Saretto and Tookes (2013). Lender FX Usage
is significantly positively related to CDS Trading (0/1) confirming the validity of the
inclusion restriction. The second stage results show that, the e ect of CDS trading
on Lead Share (%) and Sole Lender (0/1) remains highly significant after addressing
the endogeneity of CDS inception. Note that we lose observations compared to the
baseline specification (Table 2), as FX derivative holdings are not available for all lead
arrangers (e.g., foreign banks and nonbank lenders).
4.3 Does the E ect of CDS Trading on Loan Syndication Vary with
Bank CDS Holdings, Loan Size, and CDS Liquidity?
Our evidence so far suggests that CDS trading has a significant impact on loan syn-
dication. This evidence, however, is indirect in nature. Ideally one would like to have
bank-level data on individual CDS holdings, i.e., detailed CDS holdings including the
14
respective reference entities, which would allow for a clearer identification of the e ect.
Unfortunately, such data is not available. Banks are only obligated to disclose CDS
holdings in an aggregated form and only since 2006. Nevertheless, this information
allows for the classification of banks into CDS users and CDS nonusers. We construct
a dummy variable, CDS Bank (0/1), which equals one if a lead lender ever reports a
positive notional CDS amount (purchased protection) in the sample period, and zero
otherwise.12 Further, we use Bank CDS Holdings, i.e., the notional CDS amount ($mil-
lion) that the lead lender reports in the quarter prior to the loan issue. While CDS
Bank (0/1) is a bank-fixed e ect and therefore defined over the entire sample period,
Bank CDS Holdings is only available from 2006 onwards. Using these two proxies
we test if the e ect of CDS trading on syndication propensity varies with bank CDS
activity. Note that similar to the IV estimation (cf. Section 4.2) we lose observations
compared to the baseline specification, as CDS holdings are not available for all lead
arrangers. The results are reported in Table 4, Panel A.
[Table 4 here]
These results show that the e ect of CDS trading on syndication propensity is
particularly strong if the lead arranger is a CDS user or if the lead arranger reports
high CDS holdings in the quarter prior to the loan issue. While these results provide
further evidence that there is a direct e ect of CDS trading on primary loan market
allocation, the results are consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and 2. Banks may be
12 One drawback of this measure is that it uses information from the 2006 to 2010 period to classify
banks over the 2000 to 2010 period as banks are obligated to disclose CDS holdings only from 2006
on. However, there is little time-variation in CDS usage on the bank-level in the 2006 to 2010
period, i.e., banks either always or never report positive CDS amounts. This justifies treating CDS
usage as a bank-fixed e ect.
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less likely to participate in a loan if they perceive the likelihood that the lead arranger
hedges the default risk via CDS as high. Alternatively, banks that overall use more
CDS may rely less on syndication. Hence, the results support the conjecture that CDS
are a flexible risk management tool. We di erentiate the moral hazard from the risk
management e ect in Section 5.
Saretto and Tookes (2013) document that firms with CDS traded on their debt main-
tain higher leverage ratios. Shan et al. (2014) provide evidence that firms with actively
traded CDS on their debt obtain larger loans than non-CDS firms. If this is the case,
the e ect of CDS trading on primary loan market allocation may be even more promi-
nent than documented so far. We therefore explicitly test if the e ect of CDS trading
on syndication propensity varies with loan size. The results are reported in Table
4, Panel B. They indicate that the e ect of CDS trading on syndication propensity
increases in loan size. Banks are in particular more likely to fully retain larger loans
on their balance sheet once protection via CDS is available. This is a first indication
that banks use CDS as risk management tools, as any risk management e ect should
be particularly strong for economically relevant loans. The e ect, however, is only
borderline significant.
Du ee and Zhou (2001) show theoretically that CDS can replace loan sales as
CDS are a flexible way to temporarily lay o  credit risk. However, the flexibility of
CDS is likely determined by the liquidity in the CDS market. If the CDS that are
traded on the borrowers’ debt are illiquid, CDS trading is unlikely to have an e ect
on syndication propensity. We address this issue and use the borrowers’ CDS bid-ask
spread in the month before the loan origination as a proxy for the liquidity. We divide
CDS Trading (0/1) intro three subsets: CDS Trading (0/1)*Low Liquidity (0/1), CDS
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Trading (0/1)*Medium Liquidity (0/1), and CDS Trading (0/1)*High Liquidity (0/1).
Low, medium, and high liquidity are indicator variables for three CDS bid-ask spreads
quantiles. The results reported in Table 4, Panel C, show that the e ect of CDS trading
on syndication is increasing in CDS liquidity.
5. Risk Management versus Moral Hazard
The evidence so far is consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and 2. Lead arrangers may be
less likely to syndicate a loan because CDS are a more flexible risk management tool.
Alternatively, lead arrangers may be less likely to syndicate a loan because investors
are less willing to participate if the lender can no longer credibly commit to monitor
the borrower. In this section, we di erentiate the risk management from the moral
hazard channel. In the ideal experimental environment, bank monitoring would be
observable and CDS trading would be random. That is, it would be revealed after the
loan contract is finalized whether the bank is able to hedge credit risk via CDS or not.
If the assignment is random and if loan contract terms cannot be changed after the
contract is finalized, the e ect of CDS trading on bank monitoring would be causal.
Unfortunately, bank monitoring is not observable, hence we have to rely on indirect
tests. In particular, we analyze whether the e ect of CDS trading on syndication
varies across borrowers and banks. Moral hazard problems are especially severe if the
borrower requires extensive monitoring, or if the bank reputation is low. Further, we
analyze whether CDS trading has a direct e ect on loan outcomes that are correlated
with monitoring services provided by banks, i.e., covenant violations.
In our empirical setting CDS trading is not random. In particular, as documented
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in Section 4., CDS trading has a direct impact on syndication propensity and the loan
share retained by the lead arranger, which in turn has an e ect on bank monitor-
ing. This is particularly problematic when we analyze loan outcomes, i.e., covenant
violations following loan issues. As before, we control for bank and firm fixed e ects
to control for unobservable time-invariant e ects. Further, we perform the analysis
of covenant violations both at the loan-level and at the firm-level. First, we analyze
whether firms are in general more likely to violate loan covenants after CDS are ac-
tively traded on the firm’s debt. Second, we analyze whether firms are more likely to
violate a covenant in the k quarters after obtaining a loan if the lender can hedge the
credit risk via CDS. In particular, we compare loans by the same firm before versus
after CDS are actively traded on the firm’s debt controlling for the lead share. Note
that due to data limitations this analysis is still indirect and we cannot control for un-
observable time-variant e ects such as post-issue changes in loan contract terms and
lead share.
5.1 Cross-Borrower Variation
If the moral hazard e ect is the dominant one, then this problem should be especially
severe for borrowers that require extensive monitoring. Therefore, we analyze if the
e ect of CDS trading on syndication propensity is especially pronounced for more risky
borrowers, and more opaque borrowers. We use a dummy variable, which equals one if
the borrower has a sub-investment grade rating at the time of the loan origination, and
zero otherwise as a proxy for borrower risk. We further use the borrowers’ distance-to-
default and Altman Z-Score. We use the number of analysts covering the firm and the
fraction of tangible to total assets as proxies for firm opaqueness. Firms with higher
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analyst coverage and a larger fraction of fixed assets are typically assumed to be less
opaque. Results are reported in Table 5.
[Table 5 here]
The results show that the e ect of CDS trading on syndication propensity does
not di er between borrowers with di erent required monitoring intensities, which is
unsupportive of Hypothesis 2.13
5.2 Bank Reputation
As shown theoretically by Parlour and Winton (2013), moral hazard problems arising
from CDS trading are less severe if lender reputation is high. Therefore, the e ect of
CDS trading on syndication should be particularly strong for less reputable firms if
moral hazard is a significant concern. Following Sufi (2007), we measure lead arranger
reputation, Bank Reputation, by the market share (by amount) of the lead arranger
in the year prior to the loan in question. We further follow Ross (2010) and create a
dummy variable, Big-3 Bank (0/1), which equals one if Citibank, JP Morgan Chase,
or Bank of America are the lead arranger, and zero otherwise. Ross (2010) provides
evidence that these three large banks control the majority of the US syndicated loan
market and have a particularly high reputation for screening and monitoring borrowers.
In addition, we extend this proxy to comprise the ten most active banks in the US
syndicated loan market (Big-10 Bank (0/1)).
13 Note that we only report the results using Sole Lender (0/1) as the dependent variable in Section
5.1 and 5.2 to save space. The results using Lead Share (%) are virtually identical and available
upon request.
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[Table 6 here]
Results reported in Table 6 show that the e ect of CDS trading on syndication
propensity does not vary significantly across banks with di erent reputations. If any-
thing, the results suggest that the e ect is stronger for more reputable banks. This is
consistent with a risk management e ect: larger, more reputable banks are more likely
to actively use CDS (see Hirtle (2009) and Section 4.3).
5.3 Loan Outcomes
Finally, we examine variables that are likely to be a ected by the monitoring service
provided by banks. In particular, we analyze loan covenant violations.14
[Table 7 here]
The results reported in Table 7, column 1, show that firms are in general signifi-
cantly less likely to violate a financial covenant once CDS are available. This evidence
is again unsupportive of Hypothesis 2 but consistent with the notion that CDS are
traded on rated, financially sound firms where moral hazard problems are unlikely.
Also the loan-level analysis, Table 7, columns 2-3, indicates that firms are not more
likely to violate covenants following loan issues before versus after CDS are actively
traded on the firms’ debt.
Overall, we document that the e ect of CDS trading on primary loan market
allocation is particularly strong if (i) the loan is large, (ii) the lead arranger actively
14 We are grateful to Amir Sufi for providing this data. See Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Sufi et al.
(2009) for a detailed description of the data collection process.
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uses CDS, (iii) the CDS market is liquid, and (iv) the lead arranger reputation is high.
Further, (v) borrowers are not more likely to violate loan covenants once CDS are
actively traded on the borrowers’ debt. This evidence suggests that banks rely less
on loan syndication if CDS are available, because tailor-made CDS are a more flexible
risk management tool.
6. Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence on how credit derivative trading a ects loan
syndication. Using CDS trading data and a large sample of syndicated loans, we show
that lenders sell significantly lower fractions of loans and are less likely to syndicate
loans once credit protection via CDS is possible. These results are robust to controlling
for the potential endogeneity of CDS introduction. The e ect of CDS trading on
primary loan market allocation is stronger if (i) the loan is larger, (ii) CDS liquidity
is higher, and (iii) the lead arranger actively uses CDS contracts.
We further show that (iv) the CDS e ect does not vary across borrowers who
require di erent monitoring intensities and that the e ect (v) is particularly strong
if the lead arranger reputation is high. Further, (vi) borrowers are not more likely
to violate loan covenants once CDS are actively traded on the borrowers’ debt. If
anything, the likelihood of a covenant violation decreases after CDS inception. These
results are unsupportive of the conjecture that lenders can no longer credibly commit
to monitor a borrower if laying o  credit risk anonymously via CDS is possible (Parlour
and Winton (2013)).
This study helps to understand the impact of CDS trading on the nature and
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operation of credit markets. Though the importance of credit derivatives has grown
enormously in recent years, these e ects are not yet fully understood. We provide
evidence, which is consistent with CDS being a flexible risk management tool for
banks.
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Figure 1: CDS Introduction and Loan Share Retained by Lead Arranger
This figure shows the average (median) loan share retained by the lead arranger before
and after CDS are actively traded on the borrowers’ debt ([-2,+2] years surrounding
the CDS introduction). Further reported is a control group, i.e., lead shares in loans
to borrowers who never have actively traded CDS on their debt but who are otherwise
similar to the treated group. Loans are matched based on the observable loan and
borrower characteristics reported in Table 1.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Firms With vs Firms Without Actively Traded CDS Contracts
This table reports summary statistics for CDS trading indicators, the loan share retained by the lead arranger, loan characteristics, and borrower characteristics.
CDS Traded indicates whether the firm has actively traded CDS on its debt at any point in time during the sample period. All variables are defined in the
Appendix.
CDS Traded = 0 CDS Traded = 1
Mean Median Std Observations Mean Median Std Observations
Panel A: CDS Trading Indicators
CDS Trading (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 15,406 0.513 1.000 0.500 5,716
Panel B: Loan Characteristics
Lead Share (%) 62.388 59.100 35.659 6,195 32.807 23.125 24.734 2,104
Sole Lender (0/1) 0.158 0.000 0.365 15,406 0.015 0.000 0.122 5,716
Facility Amount (million USD) 240.980 125.000 396.974 15,406 1,140.689 600.000 2,114.723 5,716
Maturity (Months) 47.355 50.000 22.967 15,406 39.435 36.000 23.750 5,716
All In Spread Drawn (bps) 240.736 225.000 158.040 15,406 124.181 75.000 124.460 5,716
Secured (0/1) 0.621 1.000 0.485 15,406 0.217 0.000 0.412 5,716
Performance Pricing (0/1) 0.494 0.000 0.500 15,406 0.529 1.000 0.499 5,716
# Financial Covenants 1.795 2.000 1.502 15,406 1.045 1.000 1.109 5,716
Panel C: Borrower Characteristics
Total Assets (million USD) 2,070.527 779.091 5,615.610 15,406 17,700.643 10,241.409 21,084.003 5,716
Leverage 0.306 0.274 0.254 15,406 0.320 0.291 0.177 5,716
Coverage 18.603 5.196 52.186 15,406 10.221 6.154 15.394 5,716
Profitability 0.137 0.127 0.206 15,406 0.205 0.174 0.141 5,716
Tangibility 0.330 0.263 0.247 15,406 0.400 0.384 0.225 5,716
Current Ratio 1.840 1.571 1.187 15,406 1.330 1.213 0.609 5,716
Market-To-Book 1.656 1.363 0.976 15,406 1.664 1.404 0.812 5,716
Investment Grade (0/1) 0.147 0.000 0.354 15,406 0.749 1.000 0.433 5,716
Not Rated (0/1) 0.546 1.000 0.498 15,406 0.027 0.000 0.162 5,716
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Table 2: CDS Trading, Syndication Propensity, and Lead Share
This table reports di erence-in-di erences OLS regression results analyzing the impact of CDS trading
on syndication propensity and the loan share retained by the lead arranger. Sole Lender (0/1) is a
dummy variable, which equals one for single lender loans and zero for syndicated loans Lead Share
(%) is the percentage of the loan held by the lead arranger. CDS Trading (0/1) is a dummy variable,
which equals one if CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt at the time of the loan origination,
and zero otherwise. Fixed e ects for borrower x lender, year, borrower credit rating, loan purpose, and
loan type are included when indicated. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations
within firms. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%,5%,1% level.
(1) (2)
Sole Lender (0/1) Lead Share (%)
CDS Trading (0/1) 0.029úúú 5.480úú
(0.008) (2.262)
ln(Facility Amount) -0.012úúú -1.830úúú
(0.002) (0.520)
ln(Maturity) -0.018úúú -4.618úúú
(0.004) (0.803)
Secured (0/1) 0.001 -1.159
(0.007) (1.619)
Performance-Pricing (0/1) -0.012úú -8.519úúú
(0.006) (1.539)
ln(# Financial Covenants) -0.013ú -3.791úú
(0.006) (1.769)
ln(Total Assets) -0.031úúú -4.649úúú
(0.010) (1.687)
Leverage -0.030 -0.755
(0.027) (2.381)
Coverage -0.000 0.017
(0.000) (0.014)
Profitability -0.002 5.902
(0.027) (4.307)
Tangibility -0.009 9.091
(0.043) (10.757)
Current Ratio 0.009ú 2.655úúú
(0.005) (0.878)
Market-To-Book -0.004 -2.532úú
(0.005) (1.058)
Intercept 0.674úúú 150.580úúú
(0.091) (15.975)
Observations 21,122 8,299
Adj. R2 0.027 0.139
Borrower x Lender Fixed E ects Yes Yes
Time Fixed E ects Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed E ects Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed E ects Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed E ects Yes Yes
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Table 3: CDS Trading and Primary Loan Market Allocation - IV Estimation
This table reports instrumental variable regression results analyzing the impact of CDS trading on
primary loan market allocation. The instrument for CDS trading, Lender FX Usage, is the average
amount of foreign exchange derivatives held by all lead arrangers that lend money to the borrower in
the previous five years as a fraction of the total assets of the lead arrangers. A probit model is used to
obtain the probability of CDS trading for each firm-year (column 1). The predicted probability is used
as the instrumental variable in the models reported in column 2 and column 3. The dependent variable
in the first stage, CDS Trading (0/1), is a dummy variable which equals one if CDS are actively traded
on the firm’s debt and zero otherwise. Sole Lender (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one for
single lender loans and zero for syndicated loans. Lead Share (%) is the percentage of the loan held
by the lead arranger. Fixed e ects for borrower x lender, year, industry, borrower credit rating, loan
purpose, and loan type, as well as other loan and borrower characteristics are included when indicated.
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered
at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *,**,*** Indicate statistical
significance at the 10%,5%,1% level.
(1) (2) (3)
CDS Trading (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Lead Share (%)
Lender FX Usage 3.229úú
(1.381)
Instrumented CDS Trading -0.083úúú -19.494úúú
(0.026) (5.584)
Intercept -4.248úúú 0.565úúú 104.313úúú
(0.651) (0.089) (21.141)
Observations 39,513 18,480 6,877
Adj. R2 0.0236 0.144
Pseudo R2 0.482
First-Stage F-Statistic 1471.44úúú
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No Yes Yes
Borrower x Lender Fixed E ects No Yes Yes
Time Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E ects Yes No No
Credit Rating Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed E ects No Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed E ects No Yes Yes
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Table 4: CDS Trading and Syndication Propensity: The Impact of Loan Size, CDS Liquidity, and Bank CDS Holdings
This table reports di erence-in-di erences OLS regression results analyzing how the impact of CDS trading on syndication propensity varies with bank CDS holdings
(Panel A), loan size (Panel B), and CDS market liquidity (Panel C). Sole Lender (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one for single lender loans and zero for
syndicated loans. CDS Trading (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt at the time of the loan origination,
and zero otherwise. ln(Facility Amount) is the log of facility volume ($ million). Low Liquidity (0/1)/Medium Liquidity (0/1)/High Liquidity (0/1) is a dummy
variable which equals one if the borrower’s CDS bid-ask spread is in the low/medium/high quantile in the month prior to the loan issue, and zero otherwise. CDS
Bank (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if the lead lender ever reports a positive notional CDS amount (purchased protection) in the 2000 to 2010 period,
and zero otherwise. ln(Bank CDS Holding) is the log of notional CDS $ amount (purchased protection) that the lead lender reports in the quarter prior to the
loan issue. Fixed e ects for borrower x lender, year, borrower credit rating, loan purpose, and loan type, as well as other loan and borrower characteristics are
included when indicated. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for
non-independent observations within firms. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%,5%,1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1)
Panel A: Bank CDS Holdings
CDS Trading (0/1)*CDS Bank (0/1) 0.122úú
(0.060)
CDS Trading (0/1)*ln(Bank CDS Holding) 0.029úúú
(0.011)
ln(Bank CDS Holding) -0.014ú
(0.008)
Panel B: Loan Size
CDS Trading (0/1)*ln(Facility Amount) 0.009ú
(0.005)
ln(Facility Amount) -0.014úúú
(0.002)
Panel C: CDS Liquidity
CDS Trading (0/1)*Low Liquidity (0/1) 0.015úú
(0.007)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Medium Liquidity (0/1) 0.024úúú
(0.008)
CDS Trading (0/1)*High Liquidity (0/1) 0.026úú
(0.011)
CDS Trading (0/1) -0.102ú -0.548úú -0.154
(0.060) (0.226) (0.109)
Intercept 0.566úúú 0.644ú 0.698úúú 0.671úúú
(0.099) (0.350) (0.093) (0.091)
Observations 14,326 4,744 21,122 21,122
Adj. R2 0.034 0.066 0.027 0.026
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower x Lender Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Risk Management vs Moral Hazard: Cross-Borrower Variation in Monitoring Intensity and Opacity
This table reports di erence-in-di erences OLS regression results analyzing how the impact of CDS trading on primary loan market allocation varies with borrower
risk and borrower opacity. Sole Lender (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one for single lender loans and zero for syndicated loans. CDS Trading (0/1)
is a dummy variable, which equals one if CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt at the time of the loan origination, and zero otherwise. # Analysts is
the number of analysts covering the borrower at the time of the loan origination. Tangibility is defined as net property plant and equipment divided by total
assets. Sub-Investment Grade (0/1) is a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower is rated BB+ or worse at the time of the loan issue, and zero otherwise.
Distance-To-Default is the borrower’s distance-to-default at the time of the loan issue. Altman Z is the borrower’s Altman Z-Score at the time of the loan issue.
Fixed e ects for borrower x lender, year, borrower credit rating, loan purpose, and loan type, as well as other loan and borrower characteristics are included when
indicated. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent
observations within firms. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%,5%,1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1)
CDS Trading (0/1) 0.027úú 0.028úúú 0.029úúú 0.032úú 0.038úúú
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012)
CDS Trading (0/1)*ln(1 + #Analysts) 0.001
(0.004)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Tangibility 0.001
(0.027)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Sub-Investment Grade (0/1) 0.003
(0.015)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Distance-To-Default -0.002
(0.003)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Altman Z -0.003
(0.003)
ln(1 + #Analysts) -0.007úúú
(0.002)
Tangibility -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 0.021 -0.002
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.049) (0.045)
Sub-Investment Grade (0/1) 0.008
(0.010)
Distance-To-Default -0.000
(0.003)
Altman Z -0.002
(0.004)
Intercept 0.662úúú 0.674úúú 0.661úúú 0.705úúú 0.695úúú
(0.090) (0.091) (0.089) (0.110) (0.095)
Observations 21,122 21,122 21,122 17,229 20,587
Adj. R2 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.027 0.027
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower x Lender Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed E ects Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Risk Management vs Moral Hazard: Lead Arranger Reputation
This table reports di erence-in-di erences OLS regression results analyzing how the impact of CDS
trading on primary loan market allocation varies with the reputation of the lead arranger. Sole Lender
(0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one for single lender loans and zero for syndicated loans. CDS
Trading (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s
debt at the time of the loan origination, and zero otherwise. Bank Reputation is the market share
(by amount) of the lead arranger in the year prior to the loan in question. Big-3 Bank (0/1) is a
dummy variable, which equals one if the lead bank is either Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, or Bank of
America, and zero otherwise. Big-10 Bank (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if the lead
bank is one of the ten most frequent lead arrangers in the loan sample, and zero otherwise. Fixed
e ects for borrower x lender, year, borrower credit rating, loan purpose, and loan type, as well as
other loan and borrower characteristics are included when indicated. All variables are defined in the
Appendix. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for
non-independent observations within firms. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%,5%,1%
level.
(1) (2) (3)
Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1) Sole Lender (0/1)
CDS Trading (0/1) 0.024 0.014 -0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Bank Reputation 0.049
(0.128)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Big-3 Bank (0/1) 0.019
(0.017)
CDS Trading (0/1)*Big-10 Bank (0/1) 0.037úú
(0.017)
Bank Reputation -0.028
(0.061)
Intercept 0.622úúú 0.672úúú 0.668úúú
(0.084) (0.091) (0.091)
Observations 20,551 21,122 21,122
Adj. R2 0.025 0.027 0.027
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Borrower x Lender Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Risk Management vs Moral Hazard: Loan Outcomes
This table reports di erence-in-di erences OLS regression results analyzing the impact of CDS trading on covenant violations. Column 1 presents firm-level
evidence. Columns 2-3 present loan-level evidence. CDS Trading (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if CDS are actively traded on the firm’s debt in
quarter t (column 1) or at the time of loan origination (columns 2-3), and zero otherwise. Covenant Violation (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if the
firm violated a covenant in quarter t, and zero otherwise. Covenant Violation (t+k) (0/1) is a dummy variable, which equals one if the firm violated a covenant in
the k quarters following the loan origination, and zero otherwise. Fixed e ects for borrower x lender, firm, year, borrower credit rating, loan purpose, and loan type,
as well as other loan and borrower characteristics are included when indicated. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%,5%,1% level.
Firm-Level Loan-Level
(1) (2) (3)
Covenant Violation (0/1) Covenant Violation (t+4) (0/1) Covenant Violation (t+8) (0/1)
CDS Trading (0/1) -0.011ú 0.032 -0.031
(0.006) (0.048) (0.060)
Lead Share (%) 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Intercept 0.012 0.137 0.459
(0.037) (0.354) (0.548)
Observations 69,538 4,289 3,175
Adj. R2 0.010 0.079 0.079
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E ects Yes No No
Borrower x Lender Fixed E ects No Yes Yes
Time Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed E ects No Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed E ects No Yes Yes
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Appendix A
Variable Name Definition Source
CDS Trading Indicators:
CDS Trading (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt at the time
of the loan origination, and zero otherwise.
Bloomberg & CMA
CDS Traded (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if CDS are traded on the borrower’s debt at any point of time
during the sample period, and zero otherwise.
Bloomberg & CMA
Low Liquidity (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower’s CDS bid-ask spread is in the high quantile
in the month prior to the loan issue, and zero otherwise.
Bloomberg
Medium Liquidity (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower’s CDS bid-ask spread is in the medium quantile
in the month prior to the loan issue, and zero otherwise.
Bloomberg
High Liquidity (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower’s CDS bid-ask spread is in the low quantile in
the month prior to the loan issue, and zero otherwise.
Bloomberg
Loan Characteristics:
Sole Lender (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one for single lender loans and zero for syndicated loans. Dealscan
Lead Share (%) The share of the loan retained by the lead arranger in %. Dealscan
Facility Amount Overall facility volume in $million. Dealscan
Continued on next page
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- continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
Maturity Time to maturity in months. Dealscan
Secured (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan is secured, and zero otherwise. Dealscan
All In Spread Drawn The facility All In Spread Drawn (bps). Dealscan
Performance Pricing (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contains a performance pricing provision, and zero
otherwise.
Dealscan
# Financial Covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. Dealscan
Lender Characteristics:
CDS Bank (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the lead lender ever reports a positive notional CDS amount
(purchased protection) in the 2000 to 2010 period, and zero otherwise.
Call Reports
Bank CDS Holdings The notional CDS amount ($million) that the lead lender reports in the quarter prior to the loan
issue.
Call Reports
Lender FX Usage The average amount of foreign exchange derivatives held by all the lead arrangers that lend money
to the company in the previous five years as a fraction of the total loans of the lead arrangers.
Call Reports
Bank Reputation The market share (by amount) of the lead arranger in the year prior to the loan in question. Dealscan
Big-3 Bank (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the lead bank is either Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, or Bank
of America, and zero otherwise.
Dealscan
Continued on next page
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- continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
Big-10 Bank (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the lead bank is among the ten most active lead arrangers
in the US syndicated loan market, and zero otherwise.
Dealscan
Borrower Characteristics:
Total Assets Firm’s total assets in $million. Compustat
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets. Compustat
Market-to-Book Market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets. Compustat
Tangibility Net property plant and equipment divided by total assets. Compustat
Coverage Interest expenses divided by EBITDA. Compustat
Profitability EBITDA divided by total assets. Compustat
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities. Compustat
Not Rated (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was not rated by S&P at the time of the debt
issue.
Compustat
Investment Grade (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was rated BBB- or better by S&P at the time
of the debt issue.
Compustat
Sub-Investment Grade (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was rated BB+ or worse by S&P at the time
of the debt issue.
Compustat
Continued on next page
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- continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
# Analysts The number of analysts covering the borrower at the time of the loan origination. I/B/E/S
Distance-To-Default A market-based measure of default risk based on KMV/Merton methodology as described in Crosbie
and Bohn (2003):
Own Calculation,
CRSP, Compustat
(VA ≠D) / (VA ≠ ‡A).
where:
VA = market value of assets
D = debt, defined as the debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt
‡A = one-year asset volatility
VA and ‡A are unobservable, but are approximated by using the market value of equity (VE), the
one-year equity volatility (‡E), the three-month treasury bill rate (r), and debt (D) and solving
Merton (1974) model of pricing a firm’s debt and equity for a one-year time horizon (T = 1):
VE = VA úN(d1)≠ e≠rt úD úN(d2)
‡E = (VA/VE) úN(d1) ú ‡A
where:
d1 =
#
ln (VA/D) +
!
r + 0.5 ú ‡2A
" ú T $ / #‡A ú ÔT $
d2 = d1 ≠ ‡A ú
Ô
T
Continued on next page
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- continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
N() =the cumulative normal distribution.
Altman Z Altman Z-Score defined as 1.2 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained Earnings/Total As-
sets) + 3.3 (EBIT/Total Assets) + 0.6 (Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Debt)+ (Sales/Total
Assets).
Compustat
Covenant Violation (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the firm violated a covenant in the respective quarter, and
zero otherwise.
Sufi et al. (2009)
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